

Brief Snapshots from the *Surveying State Legislators* Literature Review

By Paul DiPerna

What have articles in reputable political science journals reported to peers in the academic community? This document lists a cross section of research findings clearly communicated in abstracts. To help better understand where the research emphasis has been for more than 50 years, the list is organized by general themes. In most instances I list the findings verbatim (but without quotes) to avoid losing any meaning. Some have been paraphrased for word economy. If one or more findings are of interest, I strongly recommend at least reading the abstract of the article so that the briefly mentioned finding is given proper context. Themes are not mutually exclusive. It is common for any given article to address two or more listed themes.

Political scientists have learned:

Ambition (or Progressive Ambition)

Legislative career orientation is associated with attainment of a leadership position, political ambition, and acceptance of legislative norms.¹

Institutional characteristics that foster progressive ambition increases the likelihood that national or local political conditions will be translated into meaningful choices at the ballot box.²

¹ E. Lee Bernick, "Anchoring Legislative Careers," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (Feb. 2001), pp. 123–43, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/440406>.

² Cherie D. Maestas, Sarah Fulton, L. Sandy Maisel, and Walter J. Stone, "When to Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S. House," *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 2 (May 2006), pp. 195–208, doi:10.1017/S0003055406062101.

Political ambitions combined with the resources offered by professional legislatures can enhance the prospects for representation of citizen interests because ambitious legislators have strong incentives to closely monitor constituent opinions while they wait for a strategic opportunity to run for higher office.³

Recruitment, Candidate Emergence

Partisan polarization may be discouraging ideological moderates in the pipeline [state legislatures] from pursuing a congressional career.⁴

Liberal Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators are less likely to run for Congress than those at the ideological poles, though this disparity is especially pronounced among Republicans.⁵

State legislators serving in professional institutions and in competitive districts are most likely to be contacted by national party leaders.⁶

There exists a strong relationship between recruitment activity and role orientation.⁷

Norms, Roles, Representation, Professionalism

³ See note 2

⁴ Danielle M. Thomsen, "Why So Few (Republican) Women? Explaining the Partisan Imbalance of Women in the U.S. Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (May 2015), pp. 295–323, doi:10.1111/lisq.12075.

⁵ ———, "Ideological Moderates Won't Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress," *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (July 2014), pp. 786–97, doi:10.1017/S0022381614000243.

⁶ Maestas, Maisel, and Stone, "National Party Efforts to Recruit State Legislators to Run for the U.S. House," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (May 2005), pp. 277–300, doi:10.3162/036298005X201554.

⁷ James A. Thurber, "The Impact of Party Recruitment Activity upon Legislative Role Orientations: A Path Analysis," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (Nov. 1976), pp. 533–49, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439660>.

Legislative norms and behaviors have adapted over time to accommodate changing member expectations and ambitions.⁸

Evidence that politicians systematically discount the opinions of constituents with whom they disagree and that this “disagreement discounting” is a contributing factor to ideological incongruence.⁹

Evidence that state legislators tend to be most representative of the mass public, when compared with county political party leaders and state bureaucrats.¹⁰

Term-limited legislators become less beholden to the constituents in their geographical districts and more attentive to other concerns.¹¹

Results show that legislative institutions, district demand, and individual traits structure legislators’ strategic representational priorities.¹²

⁸ Joel A. Thompson, Karl T. Kurtz, and Gary F. Moncrief, “We’ve Lost That Family Feeling: The Changing Norms of the New Breed of State Legislators,” *Social Science Quarterly* 77, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 344–62, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42863471>.

⁹ Daniel M. Butler and Adam M. Dynes, “How Politicians Discount the Opinions of Constituents with Whom They Disagree,” *American Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming), doi:10.1111/ajps.12206.

¹⁰ Eric M. Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, “Policy Congruence and American State Elites: Descriptive Representation versus Electoral Accountability,” *Journal of Politics* 45, no. 1 (Feb. 1983), pp. 183–96, doi:10.2307/2130330.

¹¹ John M. Carey, Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell, and Gary F. Moncrief, “The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (Feb. 2006), pp. 105–34, doi:10.3162/036298006X201742.

¹² Jeffrey J. Harden, “Multidimensional Responsiveness: The Determinants of Legislators’ Representational Priorities,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (May 2013), pp. 155–84, doi:10.1111/lsq.12009.

Legislators serving in bodies characterized as full-time, professional legislatures spend more time on the job than those in part-time institutions, but there is significant variation across states in both groups.¹³

Representational roles and behavior are related; legislators who think of themselves as delegates are much more likely to hold frequent district office hours than their counterparts who think of themselves as trustees. Overall, legislators are more likely to consider themselves trustees than delegates. Multimember districts and term limits increase the likelihood that legislators think of themselves as trustees.¹⁴

Legislators who are progressively ambitious spend more time monitoring public opinion than legislators who are non-ambitious or statically ambitious and that legislative resources augment this effect.¹⁵

Elite Views/Differences

State legislators, termed a “poorly informed elite,” appear to misperceive public opinion more often than one might expect.¹⁶

Survey data have supported the following hypotheses: (1) candidates' issue positions do not converge; (2) party elites have more extreme positions than do candidates; (3) candidate issue

¹³ Karl. T. Kurtz, Gary Moncrief, Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell, “Full-Time, Part-Time, and Real Time: Explaining State Legislators' Perceptions of Time on the Job,” *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 6, no. 3 (Sept. 2006), pp. 322–38, doi:10.1177/153244000600600304.

¹⁴ Christopher A. Cooper and Lilliard E. Richardson, “Institutions and Representational Roles in American State Legislatures,” *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 174–94, doi:10.1177/153244000600600203.

¹⁵ See note 2

¹⁶ Eric M. Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, “U.S. State Legislators' Opinions and Perceptions of Constituency Attitudes,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (Nov. 1979), pp. 563–85, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439405>.

positioning is a function of party-elite issue positions and union involvement in the campaign, as well as constituency characteristics; and (4) when candidates rely heavily on elite resources during their campaign, elites become more important in shaping candidate issue positions.¹⁷

Survey field experiments have suggested voters often defer to politicians' policy judgments.¹⁸

Experimental survey data show legislators appear similarly moderate as citizens, not more extreme; however, politically engaged citizens appear especially moderate.¹⁹

Gender Views/Differences

Women have been found to be as ambitious for public office-holding as their male counterparts.²⁰

A woman's belief structure about electoral success sustains ambition for elective office in a manner different from men.²¹

¹⁷ John Frensdreis, Alan R. Gitelson, Shannon Jenkins, and Douglas D. Roscoe, "Testing Spatial Models of Elections: The Influence of Voters and Elites on Candidate Issue Positions," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (Feb. 2003), pp. 77–101, doi:10.3162/036298003X200818.

¹⁸ David E. Broockman and Daniel M. Butler, "The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communication," *American Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming), doi: 10.1111/ajps.12243.

¹⁹ David E. Broockman, "Approaches to Studying Policy Representation," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (Feb. 2016), pp. 181–215, doi:10.1111/lsq.12110.

²⁰ Susan J. Carroll, "Political Elites and Sex Differences in Political Ambition: A Reconsideration," *Journal of Politics* 47, no. 4 (Nov. 1985), pp. 1231–43, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2130817>.

²¹ Barbara J. Burt-Way and Rita Mae Kelly, "Gender and Sustaining Political Ambition: A Study of Arizona Elected Officials," *Western Political Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 11–25, doi:10.1177/106591299204500103.

Female state legislators are much more responsive to the expected benefit of office than are males, offsetting their diminished ambition level.²²

Findings reveal that women in states with the highest percentages of female representatives introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of women, children, and families than men in their states and more than their female counterparts in low representation legislatures. Moreover, women can successfully diffuse their priorities throughout the legislative process in one of two ways: through high percentages of women in office or through the presence of a formal women's legislative caucus.²³

Comparing Australian state parliamentarians with U.S. state legislators found a positive relationship between gender and ideology among only American Democrats. In both countries, women are far more likely to serve on committees dealing with welfare, education, and children's issues. Regarding leadership roles, no direct gender effect is found in the Australian case. In the United States women are significantly less likely to hold leadership positions.²⁴

The primary effect of gender on roll call voting is that it leads female legislators to make different choices in ideology and partisanship as compared to their male counterparts.²⁵

²² Sarah A. Fulton, Cherie D. Maestas, L. Sandy Maisel, and Walter J. Stone, "The Sense of a Woman: Gender, Ambition, and the Decision to Run for Congress," *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 235-48, doi:10.1177/106591290605900206.

²³ Sue Thomas, "The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies," *Journal of Politics* 53, no. 4 (Nov. 1991), pp. 958-76, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131862>.

²⁴ Mark Considine and Iva Ellen Deutchman, "The Gendering of Political Institutions: A Comparison of American and Australian State Legislators," *Social Science Quarterly* 75, no. 4 (Dec. 1994), pp. 854-66, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42863407>.

²⁵ Shannon Jenkins, "How Gender Influences Roll Call Voting," *Social Science Quarterly* 93, no. 2 (June 2012), pp. 415-33, doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00847.x.

Compared to twenty years ago [1970s], authors found that gender differences in legislative activities have nearly disappeared, but men and women now have different legislative priorities.²⁶

Survey evidence supports the sex role socialization literature that argues that interpersonal relations figure more predominantly in the motives of female officeholders than for men.²⁷

Race/Ethnic Views, Differences

Unlike other race and gender groups, black women in state legislatures seem to share a strong consensus on which policy areas should receive priority. To these women, the most pressing issues are education, health care, economic development, and employment.²⁸

When the dependent variable is the average effectiveness rating given by three groups--lobbyists, journalists, and other legislators--there is evidence that African American representatives are evaluated negatively because of their race.²⁹

Evidence points to many significant racial differences between black and white lawmakers, especially their perceptions of black legislative life and racial progress.³⁰

²⁶ Sue Thomas and Susan Welch, "The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities of State Legislators," *Western Political Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 445–56, doi:10.1177/106591299104400212.

²⁷ Lilliard E. Richardson and Patricia K. Freeman, "Gender Differences in Constituency Service Among State Legislators," *Political Research Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (Mar. 1995), pp. 169–79, doi:10.1177/106591299504800110.

²⁸ Edith J. Barrett, "The Policy Priorities of African American Women in State Legislatures," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20, no. 2 (May 1995), pp. 223–47, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/440449>.

²⁹ Kerry L. Haynie, "The Color of Their Skin or the Content of Their Behavior? Race and Perceptions of African American Legislators," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (May 2002), pp. 295–314, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598532>.

³⁰ James Button and David Hedge, "Legislative Life in the 1990s: A Comparison of Black and White State Legislators," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (May 1996), pp. 199–218, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/440179>.

Committees

The extent to which the committee system can provide the necessary procedural efficiency will depend in part upon whether the specific organizing decisions take into account the size and partisan composition of the chamber.³¹

Findings from a study of six Colorado committees indicate that there is significant variation across committees in the extent of over-representation of interests. Committee members are likely to set the agenda, and to alter a bill or even reject it if those groups or agencies which are in the subsystem object.³²

Leadership

The expectation that legislators who exhibit strong support for the legislative party system would be more likely to look to legislative party leaders for cues is confirmed by survey evidence.³³

Legislative party leaders pressure members more on votes when the outcome affects the party valence brand. Findings provide a rationale for why legislative leaders put so much effort into media spin battles and suggest that parties' reputations affect legislative leaders' ability to pass their agenda.³⁴

³¹ Wayne L. Francis and James W. Riddlesperger, "U.S. State Legislative Committees: Structure, Procedural Efficiency, and Party Control," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (Nov. 1982), pp. 453–71, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439350>.

³² Keith E. Hamm, "The Role of 'Subgovernments' in U.S. State Policy Making: An Exploratory Analysis," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 3 (Aug. 1986), pp. 321–51, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439840>.

³³ Eric M. Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, "Partisan Cues and Decision Loci in U.S. State Legislatures," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (Nov. 1977), pp. 423–44, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439418>.

³⁴ Daniel M. Butler and Eleanor Neff Powell, "Understanding the Party Brand: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Valence," *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 2 (Apr. 2014), pp. 492–505, doi:10.1017/S0022381613001436.

More professional state legislatures tend to have more powerful leaders. There is strong support for a partisan model of legislative organization.³⁵

Rules

The presence of majoritarian rules significantly reduces the majority party's advantage in obtaining its preferred legislative outcomes, particularly as the preferences of the floor and majority-party medians diverge. These results demonstrate that the distribution of power in a legislature is a function of its full configuration of agenda-setting rules and thus provide an important qualification to theories of legislative organization.³⁶

Party

The party caucus is less central in chambers which are large or have dominant parties. Where the majority party caucus is central, legislators express greater satisfaction with committee decisions than with caucus decisions.³⁷

The value of the party brand can sometimes directly affect legislators' votes.³⁸

³⁵ Richard A. Clucas, "Legislative Professionalism and the Power of State House Leaders," *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (Mar. 2007), pp. 1–19, doi:10.1177/153244000700700101.

³⁶ Molly C. Jackman, "Parties, Median Legislators, and Agenda Setting: How Legislative Institutions Matter," *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 1 (Jan. 2014), pp. 259–72, doi:10.1017/S0022381613001291.

³⁷ Wayne L. Francis, "Leadership, Party Caucuses, and Committees in U.S. State Legislatures," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (May 1985), pp. 243–57, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439726>.

³⁸ See note 34

The party caucus is less central in chambers which are large or have dominant parties. Where the majority party caucus is central, legislators express greater satisfaction with committee decisions than with caucus decisions.³⁹

The results suggest that, although party and ideology both influence voting, the impact of party is greater. The magnitude of this impact varies, however, from chamber to chamber.⁴⁰

Examining 27 state lower chambers, authors found that overall parties exert detectable influence on 44% of all roll calls and 69% of close votes, but that the incidence of party influence varies strongly across chambers. Taking advantage of the comparative leverage the state context brings, authors learned that party influence responds significantly to measures of legislative careerism and state socioeconomic diversity, with majority size playing some role.⁴¹

Survey analysis indicates that party lends order to conflict, producing the ideological low-dimensional space that is a trademark of American politics. Where parties are not active in the legislature-Nebraska is the test case-the clear structure found in partisan politics disappears. This works to sever the connection between voters and their elected representatives and, with it, the likelihood of electoral accountability that is essential for the health of liberal democracy.⁴²

empirical tests indicate that parties interact with pivotal politics to contribute to policy gridlock and shape policy change. By bringing pressure to bear on pivotal politics "pivots" and by

³⁹ See note 37

⁴⁰ Shannon Jenkins, "The Impact of Party and Ideology on Roll-Call Voting in State Legislatures," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (May 2006), pp. 235–57, doi:10.3162/036298006X201797.

⁴¹ James Coleman Battista and Jesse T. Richman, "Party Pressure in the U.S. State Legislatures," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (Aug. 2011), pp. 397–422, doi:10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00020.x.

⁴² Gerald C. Wright and Brian F. Schaffner, "The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 2 (June 2002), pp. 367-79, doi:10.1017/S0003055402000229.

blocking policy changes that would "roll" the party, parties increase the range of policies subject to gridlock in the American political system.⁴³

Ideology

Authors use a recurring survey of state legislative candidates to allow comparisons across time, chambers, and states as well as with the U.S. Congress. They combine that survey data with roll-call voting data to estimate ideal points for all state legislators serving during the study's coverage period that are comparable across states and with the U.S. Congress.⁴⁴

Evidence points to the effect of incumbent ideology on elections in 45 state legislatures, showing that ideological extremists are more likely to be opposed in the general election than are moderates and that extremists tend to do worse in challenged elections than moderates do.⁴⁵

Religion

Findings indicate that, even when we control for political party affiliation, which is a dominant influence on roll-call voting, conservative Protestant religious affiliation and high religious salience influence legislative voting.⁴⁶

Term Limits

⁴³ Jesse Richman, "Parties, Pivots, and Policy: The Status Quo Test," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 1 (Feb. 2011), pp. 151-65. doi: 10.1017/S0003055410000638.

⁴⁴ Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty, "The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (Aug. 2011), pp 530-51, doi:10.1017/S0003055411000153.

⁴⁵ Nathaniel A. Birkhead, "The Role of Ideology in State Legislative Elections," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (Feb. 2015), pp. 55-82, doi:10.1111/lsq.12065.

⁴⁶ David Yamane and Elizabeth A. Oldmixon, "Religion in the Legislative Arena: Affiliation, Salience, Advocacy, and Public Policymaking," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (Aug. 2006), pp. 433-60, doi:10.3162/036298006X201878.

With respect to legislative behavior, term limits decrease the time legislators devote to securing pork, and heighten the priority they place on the needs of the state and on the demands of conscience relative to district interests. At the same time, with respect to the legislature as an institution, term limits appear to be redistributing power away from majority party leaders and toward governors and possibly legislative staffers.⁴⁷

Researcher have found that term limits have virtually no effect on the types of people elected to office—whether measured by a range of demographic characteristics or by ideological predisposition—but they do have measurable impact on certain behaviors and priorities reported by legislators in the survey, and on the balance of power among various institutional actors in the arena of state politics. The biggest impact on behavior and priorities shows term-limited legislators become less beholden to the constituents in their geographical districts and more attentive to other concerns. The reform also increases the power of the executive branch (governors and the bureaucracy) over legislative outcomes and weakens the influence of majority party leaders.⁴⁸

With few exceptions, the available research indicates that term limits have weakened the ability of legislatures to check the authority of their governors and have shifted the balance of power to the executive branch.⁴⁹

There are no systematic differences between term limit and non-term limit states in the composition of the legislature (e.g., professional backgrounds). Yet with respect to legislative

⁴⁷ See note 11

⁴⁸ See note 11

⁴⁹ Travis J. Baker. and David M. Hedge, "Term Limits and Legislative-Executive Conflict in the American States," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (May 2013), pp. 237–58, doi:10.1111/lsq.12012.

behavior, term limits decrease the time legislators devote to securing pork, and heighten the priority they place on the needs of the state and on the demands of conscience relative to district interests. At the same time, with respect to the legislature as an institution, term limits appear to be redistributing power away from majority party leaders and toward governors and possibly legislative staffers.⁵⁰

Specific Issues, Policies

In the area of workmen's compensation, policy outputs are not important determinants of policy outcomes.⁵¹

Using data comprising a representative nationwide sample, authors demonstrate that candidates who accepted full public funding spent less time raising money than other candidates, including those who accepted partial public funding.⁵²

Regional location, sex, the urban character of the legislative district, and ideology were found to be modestly related to individual perceptions of what constitutes corruption.⁵³

⁵⁰ [See](#) See note 11

⁵¹ Joel A. Thompson, "Outputs and Outcomes of State Workmen's Compensation Laws," *Journal of Politics* 43, no. 4 (Nov. 1981), pp. 1129–52, doi:10.2307/2130192.

⁵² Peter L. Francia and Paul S. Herrnsen, "The Impact of Public Finance Laws on Fundraising in State Legislative Elections," *American Politics Research* 31, no. 5 (Sept. 2003), pp. 520-39, doi:10.1177/1532673X03256784.

⁵³ Susan Welch and John G. Peters, "Attitudes of U.S. State Legislators Toward Political Corruption: Some Preliminary Findings," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (Nov. 1977), pp. 445–63, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439419>.

Because traditional means of influence—lobbying and campaign support, for example—explain less of the importance legislators attach to business interests than to labor interests, the influence of business seems to derive in part from structural factors.⁵⁴

Exploiting variation in the timing of laws across the states and using data on the political participation of public school teachers from 1956 to 2004, authors find that the enactment of a mandatory bargaining law significantly boosted subsequent political participation among teachers.⁵⁵

Multivariate analyses indicated that legislators' race, gender, and party affiliation were consistent correlates of crime control ideology.⁵⁶

Time Management, Priorities

Authors discuss findings from a national survey of state legislators in which they report spending more time on the job than one might anticipate given the presumably part-time nature of many state legislatures. They find that legislators serving in bodies characterized as full-time, professional legislatures spend more time on the job than those in part-time institutions, but there is also significant variation across states in both groups. They find considerable variation among individual legislators, which is related to factors such as holding a leadership position and a

⁵⁴ Margery M. Ambrosius and Susan Welch, "State Legislators' Perceptions of Business and Labor Interests," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (May 1988), pp. 199–209, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439821>.

⁵⁵ Patrick Flavin and Michael T. Hartney, "When Government Subsidizes Its Own: Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 4 (Oct. 2015), pp. 896–911, doi:10.1111/ajps.12163.

⁵⁶ Timothy J. Flanagan, Debra Cohen, and Pauline Gasdow Brennan, "Crime Control Ideology among New York State Legislators," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (Aug 1993), pp. 411–22, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439833>.

legislator's demographic characteristics. They also show how time on the job is allocated among specific components of representation.⁵⁷

Evidence has shown that several variables affect the amount of time legislators devote to casework: state level factors, the number of demands made on the legislator, and the legislator's belief about what is important.⁵⁸

Researchers show that legislators who are progressively ambitious spend more time monitoring public opinion than legislators who are non-ambitious or statically ambitious and that legislative resources augment this effect.⁵⁹

Researchers found that state legislators distinguish between casework and pork activities, rank casework ahead of pork, and that the only common variable predicting both types of service activities is members' perceptions of their constituents' preferences.⁶⁰

Legislative institutions, district demand, and individual traits structure legislators' strategic representational priorities to move toward the goal of reelection.⁶¹

Information, Media

⁵⁷ See note 13

⁵⁸ Patricia K. Freeman, and Lilliard E. Richardson. 1996. "Explaining Variation in Casework Among State Legislators". *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 21 (1). [Wiley, Comparative Legislative Research Center]: 41–56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/440157>.

⁵⁹ See note 2

⁶⁰ Mark C. Ellickson and Donald E. Whistler. "Explaining State Legislators' Casework and Public Resource Allocations," *Political Research Quarterly* September 2001 54: 553-569, doi:10.1177/106591290105400304

⁶¹ See note 12

State legislators choose information sources to complement one another in fulfilling the members' diverse information needs.⁶²

Data suggest state legislators frequently use media tactics in policy-making, although they still prefer traditional forms of legislating. While the bulk of their media tactics is aimed at constituents, state legislators also target policy elites. Evidence further suggests the frequency with which legislators use media tactics is largely a function of the resources at their disposal.⁶³

Survey data suggest that study of legislative information sources should take into account the two-step flow of information and deference to committee recommendations.⁶⁴

Legislators use information from different sources by way of different sub-processes: the development of legislation, persuasion, and the voting decision.⁶⁵

State lawmakers' perceptions of Spanish media's effectiveness, and their use of media tools, suggest that district-level Spanish-language media contexts influence lawmakers' level of engagement with the news media.⁶⁶

⁶² Bradley, Robert B.. 1980. "Motivations in Legislative Information Use". *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 5 (3). [Wiley, Comparative Legislative Research Center]: 393–406. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439552>.

⁶³ Cooper, Christopher A.. 2002. "Media Tactics in the State Legislature". *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 2 (4). Sage Publications, Inc.: 353–71. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40421470>.

⁶⁴ Donald R. Songer, "The Influence of Empirical Research: Committee vs. Floor Decision Making," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (Aug. 1988), pp. 375–92, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/439790>.

⁶⁵ Christopher Z. Mooney, "Information Sources in State Legislative Decision Making," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (Aug 1991), pp. 445–55, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/440107>.

⁶⁶ D. Xavier Medina Vidal, "Spanish-Language Media Entrepreneurship in the Statehouse," *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 15, no. 2 (June 2015), pp. 287-314, doi:10.1177/1532440015576490.